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What happens when a company that has been named "the most
innovati
ive company in the ll11ite<l States" every year between
1996 and 2001 by Fortune magazine has trouble generating Lhti
earnings
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Nol unlike l11e famous magician
and escaJJe artist Tlarry Houdini, who
used illusions lo fuse an audience's
perceptions with their realities. U1ose
tasked to steer the ship that some
refer to as the "Evil E" sel oul to do
the very same thing, only ,vilh sn1oke
scrocns and rrwTors of a different sorl.
Tl'shard to say where the sno,vbal I got
so big that il spiraled oul of control. It
probably started s1nal.l.Out accounting
fraud is a lot like lying. You have lo tell
addilioual lies lo cover for the previous
ones, and then 1nore lies still to cover
U1os1:>,
anti so on aud so om uolil tH1tlcr
the pres~nre and the scrutiny, your
house of cards evcnttLally co.mes
tun1bling down.
VVhat happened with Enron was
no exception. Broken down lo its
lo,11estcmnmon rlenon1inator, Enron's
problems stemmed from the fact that
the financial position that it reported
to the investing public was a n1aterial

do you prevent from disclosing debt
obligations ou your balance sheet that
you actually oive'! How do you report
that your operations are generating
The thing to appreciate here, however,
a healthy flow of cash when in fact
is U1alfinancial fraud is nothing new.
they are not'! At lhe intersection of
Unfortunately, companies have been
expectations and a reality that falls far
perpetrating such frauds for years. But
short lies a r,ressure point that pushed
what n1akesEnron unique, qualifying ii
Enron over tl1e edge and into a pattern
for case studies and discussious in law
of fraud and 1nanipulation that affected
schools and business schools for years
the lives and livelihoods of millions.
to co,ne, are l11emea.ns and 1netbods
Enron's ans\ver lo this dilemma ·was
by which Enron created its illusions
of prosperity and profitability. This something called the Special Purpose
article alle1npts to unravel that tangled Entity (SPE).
web. at least a portion of ii, and gives Whal Are SPEs'!
LLSa bird's eye view so that, al the very
least, we can have a belier appreciation
Tliougb SPEs are considered lo be
of what Enron did and how.
complex a1J1d complicated entities,
the general premise of a Special
The Pressure is On - Enron's
Purpose Entity is simple. An SPE is
Dilen1n1a
an entity formed for a discreet and
How do you record earnings on isolated purpose, designed to adhere
your financial stalen1onls in excess of to a specific business or economic
what you are actually earning? How objective.
departure fron1 its lrue financial
position: Enron reported misstatements
over a period of years.
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Enron used several different types of
"accounting techniques" to manipulate
its 6nru1cial statements, all of which
involved the use of the SPE structure.
For illt1stration purposes, l \vill
exa1nine only one of these techniques:
Ll1e'Y.AS 140 transact.ion." Tbe FAS
140 transaction is so named because it
is designed to comply ,vith Financial
Ho\V Enron Abused the SPE Accounting Standard 140, which sets
forth the accounting guidelines related
Slruclure
lo asset transfers in connection with
II is i1nportant to understand
structured fi11ancings.
that there are legit i1nate uses for
the SPE. which have comn1on and
noncontroversial uses in our economy;
with the securilizalion of accounl
receivables being the 1nost conunon.
The idea behind LhoSpecial Purpose
Enlily is lo narrow the scope o[ risk
to Lhc assets ru1d liabilities placed
w'ithin the SPE, such Ll1al potential
i1,vestors or equity holders' forltu1es
or misfortones will be based entirely
and exclusively on what happens to
the assets and liabilities placed within
the SPE.

J
♦

Bul it is also iinporlanl to tmderstand
and appreciate thal the SPE structure.
because of its nature and form, can
lend itself Lo being abused by those
intent on achieving accountrng results
that have no real underlying econornic
substance.

The Dark Comes to Light
To those of you outside the accotmting
world looking in, your impression of
accounting (and perhaps accountants
for that matter) may be one of strict
♦
adherence to structure and rigidity,
where, m the end, everything n1us1
balance. But those Uta! a.re closer to
the ntunbers know that accounting is
just as much art as it is science, where
Enron used this rJ\S 140 transaction
numbers cau be n1aniptdated and
effectively Lo boost ils financial
;'massaged" to paiut a picture just like
portrait. l'or example. in the year
a brush ou canvas.
2000, Enron increased its reported net
Enron filed for bankruptcy
in incon1e by $351.6 million. ,vhich was
2001. Once tl1e investigations into ;{6 percent of its reported net income.
ils financial situation began, the ft1ll That is, 36 percent of Enron's reported
earni11gs in the year 2000 weren't
breadth and depth of its fraudulent
finru1ciaJ misdeeds canto to light. actually money generated through its

r
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operations. but was money that ,vas
"engineered'' through the use of these
FAS l 40 transactions.

Generating Fictitious Revenue
- Ho"' Enron Did It
Enron, i11 addition Lo its core
operations,
had
a n11mber of
investments and bolrUngs in other
companies and operations. One of
the ways in which Enron created the
illusion of ea.ni.i.o.gswas through its
use of1hese investments and holdit1gs.
An in1portant point to note, however,
is that due to the speculative nature
of these holdings. realizing actual
cash inllow from these holdings was
doubtful at ·best. Bui Lbat didn't stop
Enron from being creative wilh these
assets. To create a situation where it
could report a transaction as earnings,
Enron took these invesllnenls and
11·ansferredthen1 into an Enron-formed
subsidiary. \l\le'll call thP.subsidiary an
''.l\sset LLC." The Asset LLC in turn
issued two classes of stock. Class
J\ ru1d Class B. The Class A stock
represented the Asset IJ.,C's voling
interests, whereas I he Class B shares
representecll the economic interest in
Llie LLC. The Class J\ jnteresls were
issued to Enron, and Lhe Class B
economic interests were issued to an
SPE, generally a "Share Trust." The
Class B interests sold lo the 11·ustwore
not entitled to voting rights, but they
\Vere entitled lo substantially all of the
eco1101nic interests i.11the Asset LLC.
Al this point, when Enron made the
transfers, il recorded Lhetransfer price
as revenue in its financial statements.
Jn lheory, Enron was selling
these assets to these Enron-forn1ed
subsidiaries
and thereby justified
recording Ute b'ansfers as sales.
However, recording Ll1u lransfers as

sales was not proper under GeneralJ y
Accepted
Accounting
Principles
(GAAP) because Enron still n1aintained
control of the lransferred assets
through its o,vnership of the Class A
voting interests. Enron ignored this
;;technicality.'' however. and chose to
record the transfers as sales any,vay.
Again, when broken down lo the
lo\vest common denominator, sin1ple
fraud is what is left.

cash inflow fron1 these transactions as
cash flows from operations when, in
fact. this was money Lhal came froin
1he lenders. not n1011eygenerated from
operations.

the lenders as debt obligations. ~\lhen
Ll1csetransactions wore vetted through
a tr8.llsparen L lens, the fallacies and
falsHies in \vhat Enron ,vas doing \vas
dear. But, of course, hindsight is 20-20.

The logical inquiry thal follows is W11ereDo \\TeGo Fron1Herc?
whal would then induce a financial
The big push now by !hose that se1
institution to givo money to a trust
under these circurnstances?
The accounting and reporting standards is
ru1swer is in the fu1al piece of tJ1e FAS how to prevent another Enron from
140 puzzle, in what is referred to as a happening in ilie future. Efforts are
Front \\/here Did tb.e Money "Total Return Swap." The swap in this under way, with the success of such
efforts being perhaps a topic for another
context was, in essence. a guarantee.
Come?
~Vith the FAS 140 transactions, Enron day. But for now, the n1e1nbers of tl1e
Understand that. for a Jagade of guru·mleed. on behalf of the trust, Uie investing and accounting standardprosperity and financiail healtb to payments the trust "'as obligated to selling community take solace in the
fact that its previously closed eyes are
work. Enron still needed an actual and pay the lenders. Therefore, whatever
tangible ·innux of cash flo\ving into shortfall resulted fron1 the ·transferred no,v open ,v.itb a heightened vigilance.
the operation. At this iunctltre, it is asset not generating the requisite cash Next time, the community hopes it
iinporta.nt to appreciate tbe clout and to service lite debt obligalion, Ellfon, ,viii see the wool before it is pulled
influence that Euron wielded wiiliin through the S\vap, guarauteed to tbe over its eyes. I
the businuss comn1unily. Everyone lenders. ln even the ,nost general of
wanted to do business "'ith Enron. terms, under GAAP \'!here one party
Everyone wanted a piece of the "Enron obligates itself to a debt obligation,
GJ\AP requires lhal Ute obligor record
pie." As a result, financial institutions
were willing to do things tliat were of a and disclose that fiomcial obligation.
"questionable natnre" to get cozy ,vith But Enron, in n1ost of n1e transactions
Enron. t\ccordingly. banks sttch as JP structured in this 1na1u1er, did not
?v!organ Chase & Co., Citigroup, ru1d disclose the obligations.
?vforgan Stanley (lenders) ,vere willing
In Sum
participants
ill Enron's
financial
1nanipulation schen1es.
rn stun, pared dotvJJ again to the

The Lenders' Role and Why
They Agreed
As was men lioncd earlier, the trust
was the entity purchasing; the Class B
interests in the Asset LLC. The trust
would finance the purchase price
of the Class B interest primarily by
borrowing under a credit facility
provided by lhe lenders.. Tl1e trust
would in Lurn transfer tl1e money to the
Asset LLC. The Asset LLC ,vouJd then
transfer tho rnoney to Enron. Eru·on
would thon iinproperly record the

lowest com1non denorninator, Enron
inJlated its earnings and cash flows
from operations (1) by improperly
recording transferred assets over
which
Eruon still rnaintained
control as sales: (2) by reporting the
proceeds from the sales as cash110\VS front operations ,vhen. in
fact. it should have recorded U1ose
items as secured borrowings;
(3) and finally. by guaranteeii1g
pay:ment of the 1noney through
the swaps, when it did not
record the money received from
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